We design mechanisms for online procurement of data held by strategic agents for machine learning tasks. The challenge is to use past data to actively price future data and give learning guarantees even when an agent's cost for revealing her data may depend arbitrarily on the data itself. We achieve this goal by showing how to convert a large class of no-regret algorithms into online posted-price and learning mechanisms. Our results in a sense parallel classic sample complexity guarantees, but with the key resource being money rather than quantity of data: With a budget constraint B, we give robust risk (predictive error) bounds on the order of 1/ √ B. Because we use an active approach, we can often guarantee to do significantly better by leveraging correlations between costs and data.
Introduction
The rising interest in the field of Machine Learning (ML) has been strongly driven by the potential to generate economic value. Firms seeking revenue optimizations can gather abundant data at low cost, apply a set of inexpensive algorithmic tools, and produce highaccuracy predictors that can massively improve future decision making. The extent of the potential value that can be created by leveraging data for prediction is apparent in the multi-million dollar competition bounties offered by companies like Netflix and the Heritage Health Foundation, but perhaps even more so in the aggressive hiring of many ML experts by companies like Google and Facebook.
Much of the theoretical results in ML aim to measure, at least implicitly, the economic efficiency of learning problems. For example, in certain settings we have a reasonably thorough understanding of sample complexity [1] which gives us the precise tradeoff between n, the quantity of data at our disposal, and the error or loss rate we want to achieve. Reducing error is always beneficial, of course, but must be weighed against the marginal cost of increasing n.
The measures of efficiency in ML have broadened in recent years, in particular because gathering data is typically orders of magnitude cheaper than labelling it. This has led to the emergence of the active learning paradigm [2-4, 12, 17] . Here, we imagine an interface between the learner and the label provider, where the learner may make label queries on data points in an online fashion. By sequentially choosing which data to label, the learner can greatly reduce the number of labels required to learn [12] .
An area not addressed in the learning literature is monetary efficiency when data have differing costs. Indeed, real-world learning tasks often require obtaining examples held by self-interested, strategic agents; these agents must be incentivized to provide the data they hold, and they have heterogeneous costs for doing so.
In this vein, the present paper seeks to address the following question:
In a world where data is offered to us at heterogeneous prices by self-interested agents, and in particular when these prices may be arbitrarily correlated with the underlying data, how can we design mechanisms that are incentive-compatible, have robust learning guarantees, and optimize the cost-efficiency of learning?
We will address this question for the classic problem of statistical learning which we now describe.
From sample complexity to budget efficiency
The classical problem in statistical learning theory is the following. We are given n datapoints (examples) z 1 , . . . , z n ∈ Z sampled from some distribution D. Our goal is to select a hypothesis h ∈ H which "performs well" on unseen data from D. We can specify performance in terms of a loss function (h, z), and we write L(h), known as the risk of h, to be the expectation of (h, z) on a random draw z from D. The goal is to produce a hypothesish whose risk is not much more than that of h * , the optimal member of H. For example, in binary classification, each data point consists of a pair z = (x, y) where x encodes some "features" and y ∈ {−1, 1} is the label; a hypothesis h is a function that predicts a label for a given set of features; and the loss (h, (x, y)) is 0 if h(x) = y and is 1 otherwise.
Research in statistical learning theory attempts to characterize how well such tasks can be performed in terms of the resources available and the inherent difficulty of the problem. The resource is usually the quantity of data n. In binary classification, for instance, the difficulty or richness of the problem is captured by the "VC-dimension" d, and a famous result is that there is an algorithm achieving the bound
In the present work we consider an alternative scenario: the learner has a fixed budget B and can use this budget to purchase examples. More precisely, on round t of a sequence of T rounds, agent t arrives with data point z t , sampled i.i.d. from some D, and a cost c t ∈ [0, 1]. The learning mechanism may offer a menu of take-it-or-leave-it prices π t (z), with a possibly different price π t (z) for each data point z. The arriving agent observes the price π t (z t ) offered for her data and accepts as long as π t (z t ) ≥ c t , in which case the mechanism pays the agent π t (z t ) and learns (c t , z t ).
1 Our goal is to actively select data to purchase, subject to a budget B, in order to minimize the risk of our final outputh. At a high level, our main result is as follows:
Main Result 1 (Informal). For a large class of problems, there is an active data purchasing algorithm that spends at most B in expectation and outputs a hypothesish satisfying,
where γ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter of the (cost, data) sequence capturing the monetary difficulty of learning and the expectation is over the algorithm's internal randomness. The only prior knowledge required is a rough estimate of γ.
2
Our results highlight parallels to classical bounds such as Equation 1 . The key resource constraint of the problem is now the budget B. 3 We also identify a parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] that captures the monetary difficulty of the setting. γ is roughly defined as the average product of an arriving datapoint's cost and its "difficulty score". An important illustration of the role of γ is the following. If the average cost of the data goes to 0, then γ → 0 and Main Result 1 guarantees good learning for cheap. The same holds if the average "difficulty score" of the data goes to 0.
But in some settings, the average cost of data is large and the average "difficulty score" is also large. The purchasing problem appears difficult, requiring a large budget; and the learning-theoretic problem also appears difficult relative to the traditional resource of quantity of data. However, due to beneficial correlations between difficulty and cost, it may be that the parameter γ remains relatively small. In this case, Main Result 1 implies that we can learn at a much more efficient rate relative to the resource we care about, the budget. And crucially, this fact would not have been apparent by considering either the economic or the learning-theoretic aspects of the problem in isolation.
Overview of Techniques
Our general idea for attacking this problem is to utilize online learning algorithms (OLAs) for regret minimization [6] . These algorithms output a hypothesis or prediction at each step t = 1, . . . , T , and their performance is measured by the summed loss of these predictions over all the steps. The idea is that the hypotheses produced by the OLA at each step can be used 1 We will discuss the interaction model further in Sections 2 and 8. 2 Knowledge of γ can be weakened with gracefully degrading guarantees; for instance, a rough estimate of the mean of the arriving costs suffices.
3 Assuming that budget is scarce relative to data; see formal theorems for details. Risk bound (main result) Figure 1 : Algorithmic and analytic approach. First, we convert "Follow-the-RegularizedLeader" online no-regret algorithms (a broad class) into mechanisms that purchase data for a regret-minimization setting that we introduce for purposes of analysis. Then, we convert these into mechanisms to solve our main problem, statistical learning. The mechanisms interact with the online learning algorithms as black boxes, but the analysis relies on "opening the box".
both to determine the value of data during the procurement process and to generate a final prediction.
In Section 3, we lay out the tools we need for a pricing and learning mechanism to interact with OLAs. The first high-level problem is that, because of the budget constraint, our OLA will only see a small subset of the data sequence. We use the tool of importance-weighting to give good regret-minimization guarantees even when we do not see the entire data sequence. The second problem is how to aggregate the hypotheses of the OLA and convert its regret guarantee into a risk guarantee for our statistical learning setting. This is achieved with the standard "online-to-batch" conversion [7] .
Given the tools of Section 3, the key remaining challenge is to develop a pricing and learning strategy that achieves low regret. We address this question in Section 4. We formally define a model of online learning for regret minimization with purchased data, in which the mechanism must output a hypothesis at each time step and perform well in hindsight against the entire data sequence, but only has enough budget to purchase and observe a fraction of the arriving data. We defer until later our detailed analysis of this setting, derivation of a pricing strategy, and lower bounds. At this point, we present our pricing strategy and prove regret guarantees for this setting.
In Section 5, we prove our main results: risk guarantees for a learner with budget B and access to T arriving agents. These bounds follow directly by using the tools in Section 3 and regret-minimization results in Section 4.
In Section 6, we develop a deeper understanding of the regret minimization setting. We derive our pricing strategy from an in-depth analysis of a more analytically tractable variant of the problem, the "at-cost" setting, where the mechanism is only required to pay the cost of the arriving data point rather than the price posted. For this setting, we are able to derive the optimal pricing strategy for minimizing the regret bound of our class of learning algorithms subject to an expected budget constraint.
We also complement our upper bounds by proving lower bounds for data-purchasing regret minimization. These show that our mechanisms for the easier at-cost setting have an order-optimal regret guarantee of
γ. There is a small gap to our mechanisms for the main regret minimization setting, in which our guarantee is on the order of
, so this is a weaker guarantee). The dependence T / √ B approaches the classic √ T regret bound when B is large (approaching T ). When B is small but still superconstant, we observe the perhaps counterintuitive fact that we can achieve o(1) average regret per arrival while only observing an o(1) fraction of the arriving data; in other words, we have "no data, no regret."
All proofs appear in the appendix.
Related work
Our motivations overlap with much prior work, but the problem of generic learning with purchased data does not seem to admit active solutions from the literature. A naïve approach would be to offer the maximum price of 1 to every arriving agent until the budget is exhausted, then run the learning algorithm. To improve on this is already highly nontrivial, because as soon as one posts a price below 1, the obtained data becomes biased toward lower costs, making it unclear how to guarantee good learning properties on the entire distribution. Improvements on this naïve solution for "batch" settings have appeared in recent work, especially Roth and Schoenebeck [16] , which considered the design of mechanisms for efficient estimation of a statistic with incentive-compatible payment schemes. However, this work and others in related settings [8, 10, 14] consider "passive" solutions that do not treat different types of data points differently, e.g. drawing a posted price independently regardless of the type of datapoint. We focus on an active approach in which the marginal value of individual examples is estimated according to the current learning progress and budget.
Horel et al. [13] does take a data-dependent approach to purchasing data for learning, but focuses on a quite different learning setting, focusing on a model of regression with noisy samples and using a budget-feasible mechanism design approach.
Other works such as Dekel et al. [9] , Ghosh et al. [11] , Meir et al. [15] focus on a setting in which agents may misreport their data (see also the peer-prediction literature). We suppose that agents may misreport their costs but not their data.
Many of the ideas in the present work draw from recent advances in using importance weighting for the active learning problem [4] . There is a wealth of theoretical research into active learning, including Balcan et al. [2] , Beygelzimer et al. [5] , Hanneke [12] and many others.
"Budgeted Learning" is a somewhat related area of machine learning, but there the budget is not monetary. The idea is that we do not see all of the features of the data points in our set, but rather have a "budget" (for instance, we may choose to observe any two of the three features height, weight, age).
Statistical Learning with Purchased Data
In this section, we formally define the problem setting. The body of the paper will then consist of a series of steps for deriving mechanisms for this setting with provable guarantees, which will finally appear in Section 5.
We consider a statistical learning problem described as follows. Our data points are objects z ∈ Z. We are given a hypothesis class H which we will assume is parameterized by vectors R d but more broadly can be any Hilbert space endowed with a norm · ; for convenience we will treat elements h ∈ H as vectors which can be added, scaled, etc. We are also given a loss function : H × Z → R that is convex in H. We assume throughout the paper that the loss function is 1-Lipschitz in h; that is, for any z ∈ Z and any h, h ∈ H we have
In many common scenarios, Z is the space of pairs (x, y) from the cross product X × Y, with x the feature input and y the label, though in our setting Z can be a more generic object. In this problem, the task is to design a mechanism implementing the operations "post", "receive", and "predict" and interacting with the problem instance as follows.
• For each time step t = 1, . . . , T :
1. The mechanism posts a pricing function π t : Z → R, where π t (z) is the price posted for data point z.
2. Agent t arrives, possessing (c t , z t ).
3. If the posted price π t (z t ) ≥ c t , then agent t accepts the transaction: The mechanism pays π t (z t ) to the agent and receives (c t , z t ). If π t (z t ) < c t , agent t rejects the transaction and the mechanism receives a null signal.
• The mechanism outputs a predictionh ∈ H.
Note that the mechanism is given the parameters Z, H, , T , and B, but the problem instance is completely unknown to the mechanism prior to to the arrivals. The design problem of the mechanism is how to choose the pricing function π t to post at each time, how to update based on receiving data, and how to choose the final prediction. The risk or predictive error of a hypothesis is
and the goal of the mechanism is to minimize the risk L(h) of its final hypothesish. The benchmark is the optimal hypotehsis in the class, h * = arg min h∈H L(h). The mechanism must guarantee that, for every input sequence (c 1 , z 1 ), . . . , (c T , z T ), it spends at most B in expectation over its own internal randomness.
Agent-mechanism interaction. The model of agent arrival and posted prices contains several assumptions. First, agents cannot fabricate data; they can only report data they actually have to the mechanism. Second, agents are rational in that they accept a posted price when it is higher than their cost and reject otherwise. Third, the mechanism can truthfully obtain the agent's costs c t .
We emphasize that the purpose of this paper is not focused on the implementation of such a setting, but instead on developing active learning and pricing techniques and guarantees. This is also intended as a simple and clean model in which to begin developing such techniques. However, we briefly note some possible implementations.
In the most straightforward one, the mechanism posts prices directly to the agent who responds directly. This would be a weakly truthful implementation, as agents have no incentive to misreport costs after they choose to accept the transaction.
One strictly truthful implementation uses a trusted third party (TTP) that can facilitate the transactions (and guarantee the validity of the data if necessary). For example, we could imagine attempting to learn to classify a disease, and we could rely on a hospital to act as the broker allowing us to negotiate with patients for their data. Then the TTP/agent interaction could proceed as follows:
1. Learning mechanism submits the pricing function π t to the TTP; 2. Agent provides his data point z t and cost c t to the TTP; 3. TTP determines whether π t (z t ) ≥ c t and, if so, instructs the learner to pay π t (z t ) to the agent and then provides the pair (z t , c t ) to the learner.
Other possibilities for strictly truthful implementation include using a bit of cryptography (see Section 8).
Tools for Converting Regret-Minimizing Algorithms
In this section, we begin with the classic regret-minimization problem and a broad class of algorithms for this problem. We then show how to apply techniques that convert these algorithms into a form that will be useful for solving the statistical learning problem with purchased data. The only missing ingredient will then be a price-posting strategy, which will be presented in Section 4.
Recap of classic regret-minimization setting and algorithms
In the classic regret-minimization problem, we have a hypothesis class H with the same assumptions as stated in Section 2. At each time t = 1, . . . , T , the algorithm posts a hypothesis h t ∈ H. A convex loss function f t : H → R arrives. 4 We assume the loss functions are 1-Lipschitz. The algorithm receives f t , updates, and posts a hypothesis h t+1 .
The loss of the algorithm on this particular input sequence is
We define the regret as compared to the best fixed hypothesis h * in hindsight:
We generally consider expected loss and regret, where the expectation is over any randomness in the algorithm (but is still for a fixed, non-random input data sequence). An algorithm is said to guarantee regret R(T ) if for every sequence of loss functions f 1 , . . . , f T , its expected regret is at most R(T ).
We utilize the broad class of Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) online algorithms (Algorithm 1). This class includes most popular no-regret algorithms such as Online Gradient Descent, Multiplicative Weights, and so on for particular choices of the regularizer G (these special cases usually have very computationally efficient updates). For example, Multiplicative Weights follows by using the negative entropy function as a regularizer, which is stronglyconvex with respect to 1 norm [6] . Online Gradient Descent follows by using the regularizer
, which is strongly-convex with respect to 2 norm. ALGORITHM 1: Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL). Note we assume in the definition a strongly-convex regularizer G.
Input: parameter η, regularizer G : H → R which is strongly-convex with respect to a norm · over H for t = 1, . . . , T do post hypothesis h t ; receive loss function f t ;
It is well-known (and indeed follows as a special case of Lemma 3.1) that, under the assumptions on our setting, FTRL algorithms guarantee an expected regret bound of O(
and this is tight in that no algorithm has a better guarantee. We will later prove generalizations of these bounds for a regret minimization setting with purchased data.
Importance-Weighting Technique for Less Data
As a starting point, suppose we wish to design an online learning algorithm that does not observe all of the arriving loss functions, but still performs well against the entire arrival sequence.
Because the arrival sequence may be adversarially chosen, a good algorithm should randomly choose to sample some of the arrivals. In this section, we abstract away the decision of how to randomly sample. (This will be the focus of Section 4.) In this section, we suppose that at each time t, after posting a hypothesis h t , a probability q t > 0 is specified by some external means as a (possibly random) function of the preceding time steps. With probability q t independently, we observe f t ; with probability 1 − q t , we do not observe f t .
Our goal is to modify our online learning algorithms for this setting and obtain a modified regret guarantee. Notice crucially that the definition of loss (2) and regret (3) are unchanged: We still suffer the loss f t (h t ) regardless of whether we observe f t .
The key technique we use is importance weighting. The idea is that, if we only observe each of a sequence of values x i with probability p i , then we can get an unbiased estimate of their sum by taking the sum of
for those we do observe. To check this fact, let 1 i be the indicator variable for the event that we observe i and note that the expectation of our sum is
. This is called importance-weighting the observations (and is a specific instance of a more general machine learning technique). Furthermore, if each
is bounded and independent, we can expect the estimate to be quite good via tail bounds.
The importance-weighted modification to an online learning algorithm is outlined in Algorithm 2. The importance-weighted regret guarantee we obtain is given in Lemma 3.1. It depends upon a key parameter at each time step, for a given hypothesis h of the online algorithm and arriving loss function f : Definition 3.1. For a norm · , a hypothesis h ∈ H, and a convex loss function f :
In this paper, we will always use a FTRL algorithm, which is assumed to have a regularizer G that is strongly-convex according to some norm · . In this case, · is the dual norm to · . We assume implicitly from now on that this · is the norm used in the definition of ∆ h,f . We can informally think of ∆ h,f both as the "difficulty" of arrival f when the current hypothesis is h, and as the "benefit" of f . This interpretation is explored in Section 4 when we define the parameter γ.
Lemma 3.1. If Algorithm 2 is run with (nonzero) probabilities q 1 , . . . , q T and FTRL as the learning algorithm, then the expected regret is bounded by where β is a constant depending on H, η is a parameter of the algorithm, and the expectation is over any randomness in the choices of h t and q t .
We can recover the classic regret bound as follows: Take each q t = 1, and note by the Lipschitz assumption that each ∆ ht,ft ≤ 1. Then by setting η = Θ 1/ √ T , we get an expected regret bounded by O √ T .
The "Online-to-Batch" Conversion
So far so good: We can convert an online regret-minimization algorithm to use smaller amounts of data (leaving the question of how and when to purchase that data till Section 4). The next question is: Given that we have such an algorithm, how can we use it to solve our original task of generating an accurate prediction based on the data?
We answer that question with a standard tool known as the "online-to-batch conversion" (so-named for converting an online learning algorithm into a "batch" or statistical learner). The standard argument (e.g. [18] ) goes as follows: Given a "batch" of i.i.d. data points, feed them to the no-regret algorithm. Because the algorithm has low regret, on average over the data points, its hypotheses predict well. But since each data point was drawn i.i.d., this means that the hypotheses on average predict well on an i.i.d. draw from the distribution. Thus it suffices to take the mean of the hypotheses or to pick one of them uniformly at random. Lemma 3.2 (Online-to-Batch [7] ). Suppose the sequence of convex loss functions f 1 , . . . , f T are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution F and that an online learning algorithm with hypotheses
We note that this conversion will continue to hold in the data-purchasing no-regret setting we define next, since all that is required is that the algorithm output a hypothesis h t at each step and that there is a regret bound on these hypotheses.
Regret Minimization with Purchased Data
In this setting, we define the problem of regret minimization with purchased data. We will design mechanisms with good regret guarantees for this problem, which will translate via the aforementioned online-to-batch conversion (Lemma 3.2) into guarantees for our original problem of statistical prediction.
The essence of the data-purchasing no-regret learning setting is that an online algorithm ("mechanism") is asked to perform well against a sequence of data, but by default, the mechanism does not have the ability to see the data. Rather, the mechanism may purchase the right to observe data points using a limited budget. The mechanism is still expected to have low regret compared to the optimal hypothesis in hindsight on the entire data sequence (even though it only observes a portion of the sequence).
Problem Definition
The data-purchasing regret minimization problem is parameterized by the hypothesis space H, number of arriving data points T , and expected budget constraint B. A problem instance is a sequence of pairs (c 1 , f 1 ), . . . , (c T , f T ) where each f t : H → R is a convex loss function and each c t ∈ [0, 1] is the cost associated with that data point. We assume that the f t are 1-Lipschitz, and let F be the set of such loss functions.
In this problem, we design a mechanism implementing the operations "post" and "receive" and interacting with the problem instance as follows.
1. The mechanism posts a hypothesis h t and a pricing function π t : F → R, where π t (f ) is the price posted for loss function f .
Agent t arrives, possessing (c t , f t ).
3. If the posted price π t (f t ) ≥ c t , then agent t accepts the transaction: The mechanism pays π t (f t ) to the agent and receives (c t , f t ). If π t (f t ) < c t , agent t rejects the transaction and the mechanism receives a null signal.
Note the key differences from the statistical learning setting: We must post a hypothesis h t at each time step (and we do not output a final prediction), and data is not assumed to come from a distribution. The goal of the mechanism is to minimize the loss (Equation 2), namely t f t (h t ). The definition of regret is also the same as in the classical setting (Equation 3). Note that we suffer a loss f t (h t ) at time t regardless of whether we purchase f t or not. The mechanism must also guarantee that, for every problem instance (c 1 , f 1 ) , . . . , (c T , f T ), it spends at most B in expectation over its own internal randomness.
The Importance-Weighting Framework
Recall that, in Section 3.2, we introduced the importance-weighting technique for online learning. This gave regret guarantees for a learning algorithm when each arrival f t is observed with some probability q t .
Our general approach will be to develop a strategy for randomly drawing posted prices π t . This will induce a probability q t of obtaining each arrival f t .
Therefore, the entire problem has been reduced to choosing a posted-price strategy at each time step. This posted-price strategy should attempt to minimize the regret bound while satisfying the expected budget constraint.
A brief sketch of the proof arguments is as follows. After we choose a posted price strategy, each q t will be determined as a function of h t , c t , and f t . (q t is just equal to the probability that our randomly drawn price exceeds the agent's cost c t .) Thus, we can apply Lemma 3.1, which (recall) stated that for these induced probabilities q t , the expected regret of the learning algorithm is
where β is a constant and η is a parameter of the learning algorithm to be chosen later.
After we choose and apply such a strategy, the general approach to proving our regret bounds is to find an a priori bound M such that 2 E t 
A First
Step to Pricing: The "At-Cost" Variant
The bulk of our analysis of the no-regret data-purchasing problem actually focuses on a slightly easier variant of the setting: If the arriving agent accepts the transaction, then the mechanism only has to pay the cost c t rather than the posted price π t (f t ). We call this the "at-cost" variant of the problem. This setting turns out to be much more analytically tractable: We derive optimal regret bounds for our mechanisms and matching lower bounds. We then take the key approach and insights derived from this variant and apply them to produce a solution to the main no-regret data purchasing problem. In order to keep the story moving forward, we summarize our results for the "at-cost" setting here and explore how they are obtained in Section 6. In the at-cost setting, we are able to solve directly for the pricing strategy that minimizes the importance-weighted regret bound of Lemma 3.1. We first state the strategy and result in Theorem 4.1, then explain and discuss. Theorem 4.1. There is a mechanism for the "at-cost" problem of data purchasing for regret minimization that interfaces with FTRL and guarantees to meet the expected budget constraint, where for a parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] (Definition 4.1), 1. The expected regret is bounded by O max
2. This is optimal in that no mechanism can have a better guarantee (up to constant factors).
3. The pricing strategy is to set K = O T B γ and draw π t (f ) randomly according to a distribution such that
The only prior knowledge required is an estimate of γ up to a constant factor.
To understand this bound, we will answer the following questions about the parameter γ:
1. How is γ formally defined?
2. When should we expect our mechanism to have approximate prior knowledge of γ?
3. What guarantees can we obtain if we do not have this knowledge?
4. What are the implications of γ's dependence on the choice of learning algorithm?
(1) How is γ defined?
Definition 4.1. For a fixed input sequence (c 1 , f 1 ), . . . , (c T , f T ), ∆ h,f in Definition 3.1, and a mechanism outputting (possibly random) hypotheses h 1 , . . . , h T , define
where the expectation is over the randomness of the algorithm. Note that γ lies in [0, 1] by our assumptions on bounded cost and Lipschitz loss.
In each term in the γ summation, ∆ ht,ft intuitively captures both the "difficulty" of the data f t and also the "value" or "benefit" of f t . To explain the difficulty aspect, by examining the regret bound for FTRL learning algorithms (e.g. the importance-weighted regret bound of Lemma 3.1 with all q t = 1), one observes that if each ∆ ht,ft is small, then we have an excellent regret bound for our learning algorithm; the problem is "easy". To explain the value aspect, one can for concreteness take the Online Gradient Descent algorithm; the larger the gradient, the larger the update at this step, and ∆ ht,ft is the norm of the gradient. And in general, the higher ∆ ht,ft , the more likely we are to purchase arrival f t .
Thus, γ captures the correlations between the value of the arriving data and the cost of that data. If either the mean of the costs or the average benefit ∆ ht,ft of the data is converging to 0, then γ → 0 and in these cases we can learn with high accuracy very cheaply, as may be expected. More interestingly, it is possible to have both high average costs, and high average data-values, and yet still have γ → 0 due to beneficial correlations. In these cases we can learn much more cheaply than might be expected based on either the economic side or the learning side alone.
(2) When should we expect to have good prior knowledge of γ? Although in general γ will be domain-specific, there are several reasons for optimism. First, γ compresses all information about the data and costs into a single scalar parameter (compare to the common mechanism-design assumption that the prior distribution of agents' values is fully known). Second, we do not need very exact estimates of γ (e.g. we do not need to know γ ± ): For order-optimal regret bounds, we only need an estimate within a constant factor of γ. Third, γ is directly proportional to K, which is a normalization constant: If we increase K, the probability of obtaining a given data point only decreases, and vice versa. In fact, the best choice of K is the normalization constant so that, if we draw prices according to the proposed distribution of Theorem 4.1, we run out of budget precisely when the last arrival leaves. Thus, K (equivalently, γ) can be estimated and adjusted online by tracking the "burn rate" (spending per unit time) of the algorithm. In simulations, we have observed success with a simple approach of estimating K based on the average correlation so far along with the burn rate, i.e. if the current estimated γ isγ and there areT steps remaining withB budget remaining to spend, set K =γT /B. This "graceful degradation" will continue to be true in the main setting. The idea is that we can follow the optimal form of the pricing strategy while choosing any normalization constant K ≥ T B γ. It may no longer be optimal, but it will ensure that we satisfy the budget and give guarantees depending on the magnitude of K. So all we need is an approximate estimate of some value larger than γ. Bothc and µ are guaranteed to upper-bound on γ, so both can be used to pick K while satisfying the budget.
To recap, knowledge of only a simple statistic such as the mean of the arriving costs suffices for good learning guarantees, with better knowledge translating to better guarantees.
(4) γ depends on the algorithm-what are the implications? If the original OLA chosen for the learning problem was a poor fit or has bad guarantees, then after being converted with our reduction, it is probably still a poor fit and γ may not be an appropriate measure of difficulty of the problem in general. However, the positive result is that if one chooses a good algorithm for the problem, the dependence on γ shows that the mechanism can take advantage of correlations when they exist. If we do have a good algorithm, a natural question is:
(4a) Can we remove the algorithm-dependence of γ? One might hope to achieve a bound depending on an algorithm-independent quantity that captures correlations between data and cost. A natural candidate is γ
In general, there are difficult cases where one can not achieve a bound in terms of γ * . However, in nicer scenarios we may expect γ to approximate γ * . For instance, suppose (h, z) = φ(h z) where φ is a differentiable 1-Lipschitz convex function (commonly-used examples include the squared hinge loss and the log loss). Under this condition, we can show that
By the regret guarantee of our mechanism when run with a good algorithm, even initialized with very weak knowledge, this difference in losses per time step is o(1), implying that γ → γ * . A deeper investigation of this phenomenon is a good candidate for future work.
Mechanisms and Results for Data-Purchasing Regret Minimization
Unlike in the "at-cost" setting, we cannot in general solve for the form of the optimal pricing strategy. This is intuitively because, when we must pay the price we post, the optimal strategy depends on c t . But the algorithm cannot condition the purchasing decision directly on c t , as this is private information of the arriving agent. We propose simply drawing posted prices according to the optimal strategy derived for the at-cost setting, namely,
but with a different choice of normalization constant K. More details about the imposed pricing distribution are given in Figure 2 . This strategy gives Mechanism 3. As in the known-costs case, our regret bounds depend upon the prior knowledge of the algorithm. It will turn out to be helpful to have prior knowledge about both γ and the following parameter, which can be interpreted as γ with all costs c t = 1:
Theorem 4.2. If Mechanism 3 is run with prior knowledge of γ and of γ max (up to a constant factor), then it can choose K and η to satisfy the expected budget constraint and obtain a regret bound of We can observe a quantifiable "price of strategic behavior" in the difference between the regret guarantees of Theorems 4.2 (this setting) and Theorem 4.1 (the "at-cost") setting:
Note that γ max ≥ γ, and they approach equality as all costs approach the upper bound 1, but become very different as the average cost µ → 0 while the maximum cost remains fixed at 1.
Comparison to lower bound. Our lower-bound for the data purchasing regret minimization problem is Ω
γ (because the lower bound for the at-cost setting, mentioned in Theorem 4.1 and stated in Theorem 6.2, applies to the general setting as well). So the difference in bounds discussed above, a factor of √ γ versus √ γ max , is the only gap between our upper and lower bounds for the general data purchasing no regret problem.
The most immediate open problem in this paper is close this gap. Intuitively, the lower bound does not take advantage of "strategic behavior" in that a posted-price mechanism may often have to pay significantly more than the data actually costs, meaning that it obtains less data in the long run. Meanwhile, it may be possible to improve on our upper-bound strategy by drawing prices from a different distribution.
Mechanism 3:
Mechanism for no-regret data-purchasing problem.
Input: parameters K, η, access to online learning algorithm (OLA) set OLA parameter η; for t = 1, . . . , T do post hypothesis h t ← OLA; for each f , post price π t (f ) drawn independently from the distribution satisfying 
Results for Statistical Learning
In this section, we give the final mechanism, Mechanism 4, for the data purchasing statistical learning problem. The idea is to simply run the regret-minimization Mechanism 3 on the arriving agents. At each stage, Mechanism 3 posts a hypothesis h t . We then aggregate these hypothesis by averaging to obtain our final prediction.
Mechanism 4:
Mechanism for statistical learning data-purchasing problem.
Input: parameters K, η, access to OLA identify each data point z with the loss function f (·) = (·, z); run Mechanism 3 with parameters η, K and access to OLA; let h 1 , . . . , h T be the resulting hypotheses; outputh = 1 T t h t (alternatively,h = a randomly chosen h t );
Theorem 5.1. Mechanism 4 guarantees spending at most B in expectation and
where g = √ γ · γ max , assuming that γ and γ max are known in advance up to a constant factor. If instead one assumes approximate knowledge respectively of γ, ofc = Proof. By Theorem 4.2, Mechanism 3 guarantees an expected regret of O max
g , √ T when run with the specified prior knowledge for the specified values of g. Therefore, the online-to-batch conversion of Lemma 3.2 proves the theorem.
The statement of Main Result 1 is the special case where only γ is known and g = √ γ.
Deriving Pricing and the "at-cost" Variant
In this section, we dig a bit deeper into the no-regret data purchasing problem, deriving our posted-price distribution and also our lower bounds. To do so, we consider a simpler "at-cost" variant of the no-regret data purchasing problem defined in Section 4: Rather than paying the price it posts, the mechanism is only required to pay the cost c t of the data it is acquiring. Otherwise, the setting is exactly the same. We first show how our posted-price strategy is derived as the optimal solution to the at-cost problem of minimizing regret subject to the budget constraint. The resulting upper bounds for the "at-cost" variant were given in Theorem 4.1. Then, we give some fundamental lower-bounds on regret, showing that in general our upper bounds cannot be improved upon here. These lower bounds also hold for the main no-regret data purchasing problem.
Deriving an Optimal Pricing Strategy
We begin by asking what seems to be an even easier question. Suppose that for every pair (c t , f t ) that arrives, we could first "see" (c t , f t ), then choose a probability with which to obtain (c t , f t ) and pay c t . What would be the optimal probability with which to take this data? Lemma 6.1. To minimize the regret bound of Lemma 3.1, the optimal choice of sampling probability is of the form
The normalization factor
The proof follows by formulating the convex programming problem of minimizing the regret bound of Lemma 3.1 subject to an expected budget constraint. It also gives the form of the normalization constant K * , which depends on the input data sequence and the hypothesis sequence.
The key insight is now that we can actually achieve the sampling probabilities dictated by Lemma 3.1 using a randomized posted-price mechanism. First, we utilize the same pricing strategy as a function of ∆ ht,f for each possible loss function f . Then whichever f t actually arrives, we are drawing prices from the "right" distribution for that f t . Second, once we fix f t , notice that the optimal sampling probability is decreasing in the associated c t . This can be achieved by drawing a posted price from the appropriate distribution. Namely, the distribution we have previously defined satisfies the dictates of Lemma 6.1 for all c t simultaneously.
Thus, our final mechanism for the at-cost variant is to simply apply Mechanism 3, but only pay the cost of the arrival rather than the price we posted. We set K = T B γ. Note that this choice of normalization constant K is different from the main setting because we on average pay less in the at-cost setting; this leads to the difference in the regret bounds. Our main bound for the at-cost variant was given in Theorem 4.
1. An open problem for this setting is whether one can obtain the same regret bounds without any prior knowledge at all about the arriving costs and data.
Lower bounds for data purchasing regret minimization
Here, we prove lower bounds analogous to the classic regret lower bound, which states that no algorithm can guarantee to do better than O √ T . These lower bounds will hold even in the "at-cost" setting, where they match our upper bounds. An open problem is to obtain a larger-order lower bound for the main setting where the mechanism pays its posted price. This would show a separation between the at-cost variant and the main problem.
First, we give what might be considered a "sample complexity" lower bound for no-regret learning: It specializes our setting to the case where all costs are equal to one (and this is known to the algorithm in advance), so the question is what regret is achievable by an algorithm that observes B of the T arrivals. ; that is, for every algorithm, there exists an input sequence on which its regret is Ω
Proof Idea: We will have two coins, with probabilities ± of coming up heads. We will take one of the coins and provide T i.i.d. flips as the input sequence. The possible hypotheses for the algorithm are {heads, tails} and the loss is zero if the hypothesis matches the flip and zero otherwise. The cost of every data point will be one.
The idea is that an algorithm with regret much smaller than T must usually predict heads if it is the heads-biased coin and usually predict tails if it is the tails-biased coin. Thus, it can be used to distinguish these cases. However, there is a lower bound of Ω 1 2 samples required to distinguish the coins, and the algorithm only has enough budget to gain information about O(B) of the samples. Setting = 1/ √ B gives the regret bound. We next extend this idea to the case with heterogeneous costs. The idea is very simple: Begin with the problem from the label-complexity lower bound, and introduce "useless" data points and heterogeneous costs. The worst or "hardest" case for a given average cost is when cost is perfectly correlated with benefit, so all and only the "useful" data points are expensive. 
Examples and Experiments
In this section, we give some examples of the performance of our mechanisms on data. We use a binary classification problem with feature vector x ∈ R d and label y ∈ {−1, 1}. The dataset is described in Figure 3 . feature vector x of grayscale pixels and a label y, the digit it depicts. We use the MNIST handwritten digit dataset (http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/). The algorithm is asked to distinguish between two "categories" of digits, where "positive" examples are digits 9 and 8 and "negative" examples are 1 and 4 (all other digits are not used). The number of training examples is T = 8503. This task allows us to adjust the correlations by drawing costs differently for different digits.
The hypothesis is a hyperplane classifier, i.e. vector w where the example is classified as positive if w · x ≥ 0 and negative otherwise; the risk is therefore the error rate (fraction of examples misclassified). For the implementation of the online gradient descent algorithm, we use a "convexified" loss function, the well-known hinge loss: (w, (x, y)) = max{0, 1−y(w ·x)} where y ∈ {−1, 1}.
In our simulations, we give each mechanism access to the exact same implementation of the Online Gradient Descent algorithm, including the same parameter η chosen to be 0.1/c where c is the average norm of the data feature vectors. We train on a randomly chosen half of the dataset and test on the other half.
The "baseline" mechanism has no budget cap and purchases every data point. The "naive" mechanism offers a maximum price of 1 for every data point until out of budget. "Ours" is an implementation of Mechanism 4. We do not use any prior knowledge of the costs at all: We initialize K = 0 and then adjust K online by estimating γ from the data purchased so far. (For a symmetric comparison, we do not adjust η accordingly; instead we leave it at the same value as used with the other mechanisms.) The examples are shown in Figure 4 . Our model of interaction, while perhaps the simplest initial starting point, involves some subtleties that may be interesting to address in the future. A key property is that we need to obtain both an arriving agent's data point z and her cost c. The reason is that the cost is used to importance-weight the data based on the probability of picking a price larger than that cost. (The cost report is also required by [16] for the same reason.) As discussed in Section 2, a naïve implementation of this model is incentive-compatible but not strictly so. Exploring implementations, such as the trusted third party approach mentioned, is an interesting direction. For instance, in a strictly truthful implementation, the arriving agent can cryptographically commit to a bid, e.g. by submitting a cryptographic hash of her cost. Then the prices are posted by the mechanism. If the agent accepts, she reveals her data and her cost, verifying that the cost hashes to her commitment. It is strictly truthful for the agent to commit to her true cost. This paper focused on the learning-theoretic aspects of the problem, but exploring the model further or proposing alternatives is also of interest for future work.
Conclusions and Directions
The contribution of this work was to propose an active scheme for learning and pricing data as it arrives online, held by strategic agents. The active approach allows learning from past data and selectively pricing future data. Our mechanisms interface with existing no-regret algorithms in an essentially black-box fashion (although the proof depends on the specific class of algorithms). The analysis relies on showing that they have good guarantees in a model of no-regret learning with purchased data. This no-regret setting may be of interest in future work, to either achieve good guarantees with no foreknowledge at all other than the maximum cost, or to propose variants on the model.
The no-regret analysis means our mechanisms are robust to adversarial input. But in nicer settings, one might hope to improve on the guarantees. One direction is to assume that costs are drawn according to a known marginal distribution (although the correlation with the data is unknown). A combination of our approach and the posted-price distributions of Roth and Schoenebeck [16] may be fruitful here.
Broadly, the problem of purchasing data for learning has many potential models and directions for study. One motivating setting, closer to crowdsourcing, is an active problem where data points consist of pairs (example, label) and the mechanism can offer a price for anyone who obtains the label of a given example. In an online arrival scheme, such a mechanism could build on the importance-weighted active learning paradigm [4] .
on the sequence of convex loss functionsf 1 , . . . ,f T . Thus, by the regret bound proof for FTRL (Lemma A.2), FTRL guarantees that for every fixed "reference hypothesis" h ∈ H:
(Recall that ∆ h,f = ∇f (h) .) Now we will take the expectation of both sides, separating out the expectation over the choice of q t , over h t , and over 1 t :
Use the importance-weighting observation above (4):
In particular, because this holds for every reference hypothesis h, it holds for h * .
Lemma A.2. Let G be 1-strongly convex with respect to some norm · . The regret of FollowThe-Regularized-Leader algorithm with regularizer G and convex loss functions f 1 , . . . , f T can be bounded by
where β is the upper bound of G(·).
Proof. We reproduce the standard proof. First, the regret of Follow-The-Regularized-Leader can be bounded by
Below we show that (
By definition, we know h t = arg min h Φ t−1 (h). Since (·) is convex and R(·) is 1-strongly convex, we know Φ t (·) is (1/η)-strongly convex for all t. Therefore, since h t+1 minimizes Φ t , by definition of strong convex, we get
After simple manipulations, we get
The last inequality comes from the fact that h t is the minimizer of Φ t−1 . Since (·) is convex, we have
The last inequality comes from the generalized Cauchy-Schwartz inequality.
Combining the above two inequalities together, we get
By squaring and shifting sides,
The proof is completed by inserting the inequality into the regret bound.
B No regret "at-cost" setting B.1 At-cost upper bounds Lemma B.1 (Lemma 6.1). To minimize the regret bound of Lemma 3.1, the optimal choice of sampling probability is of the form
The normalization factor K * ≈ T B γ.
Proof. Recall that the regret bound of Lemma 3.1 is
where q t is the probability with which we choose to purchase arrival (c t , f t ). We will solve for the choices of q t for each t.
Since β is a constant and η a parameter to be tuned later, our problem is to minimize the summation term in this regret bound. This yields the following optimization problem:
The first constraint is the expected budget constraint, as we take each point (c t , f t ) with probability q t and pay c t if we do. The second constrains each q t to be a probability.
To be completely formal, our goal is to minimize the expectation of the summation in the objective, as each h t and q t are random variables (they depend on the previous steps). However, our approach will be to optimize this objective pointwise: For every prior sequence h 1 , . . . , h t and q 1 , . . . , q t−1 , we pick the optimal q t . Therefore in the proof we will elide the expectation operators and argument. Similarly, since the budget constraint holds for all choices of q t that we make, we elide the expectation over the randomness in q t .
The Lagrangian of this problem is
with each λ, q t , α t ≥ 0. At optimum,
implying that
By complementary slackness, α t (q t − 1) = 0 at optimum, so consider two cases. If α t > 0, then q t = 1. On the other hand, if q t < 1, then α t = 0. Thus we may more simply write
Therefore, our normalization constant K * = √ λ. To solve for λ, by complementary slackness, λ ( t q t · c t − B) = 0. If λ = 0, then the form of q t and prior discussion implies that all q t = 1, and we have t c t ≤ B; in other words, we have enough budget to purchase every point. Otherwise, the budget constraint is tight and t q t · c t = B, so
Let us call those points that are taken with provability q t = 1 "valuable" and the others "less valuable", and let S be the set of less valuable points, S = {t : q t < 1}. Then we can rewrite as
This completes the proof. Let us make several final comments and observations, however. First, if the budget is small relative to the amount of data, then with Lipschitz loss functions, no data points will be taken with probability q t = 1, so S will equal all of T . In this case, the expectation of K * is exactly
γ, which is the meaning of our informal statement
γ. Second, this K * is optimal "pointwise", in that it includes advance knowledge of which data points will be taken and which hypotheses will be posted. However, notice that, to satisfy the budget constraint, it suffices to take the expectation and choose a normalization constant
Third, as noted above, the extreme case is when all q t < 1 and in this case the above K = T B γ exactly. While this will not be "as optimal" for the specific random outcomes of this sequence, it will suffice to prove good upper bounds on regret. Furthermore, it holds that any choice of K ≥ T B γ satisfies the expected budget constraint; and (by setting η as a function of K) suffices to prove an upper bound on regret.
Theorem B.1 (Theorem 4.1). There is a mechanism for the "at-cost" problem of data purchasing for regret minimization that interfaces with FTRL and guarantees to meet the expected budget constraint, where for a parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] (Definition 4.1),
The expected regret is bounded by O max
Proof. The lower bound proof appears in Theorem 6.2.
For the upper bound, we will give a more careful argument first, obtaining a more subtle bound capturing the two extremes in the regret bound as well as the spectrum in between. We will then simplify to get the theorem statement.
First, note as pointed out in the proof of Lemma 6.1 that choosing any K ≥ T B
γ ≥ E[K * ] satisfies the expected budget constraint, as each probability of purchase q t only decreases. We now just need to show that if we know γ to within a constant factor larger, i.e. set K = O T B γ and η appropriately, then we achieve the regret bound. By Lemma 3.1, for any choices of q t and the learning parameter η, the regret bound satisfies
where β is a constant. Our strategy is to set
Recall from the proof of Lemma 6.1 that in the optimal solution there were in general "valuable" points for which the probability of purchase was q t = 1 and "less-valuable" points where q t < 1. We had S = {t : q t < 1}. Thus the summation term in the regret bound becomes E t ∈S ∆ 2 ht,ft + E t∈S ∆ ht,ft √ c t K.
Before we prove the theorem statement, let us show how to achieve the more subtle bound. So for the sake of this argument, let γ S = 1 |S| E t∈S ∆ ht,ft √ c t . Let K S approximate the more precise form derived in the proof of Lemma 6.1; that is,
Then the summation term of the regret bound (Expression 6) is at most a constant times 
as each ∆ ht,ft ≤ 1. It remains to select the parameter η to use for the learning algorithm and plug into the original regret bound, Expression 5. If the algorithm has an accurate estimate of K S , |S|, and t ∈S c t , then it can set η equal to the square root of one over Expression + of heads, or of one with probability 1 2 − . It will suffice to prove the following: Claim 1: If there is an algorithm with budget B and expected regret at most T /6, then there is an algorithm to distinguish whether a coin is -heads-biased or -tails-biased with probability at least 2/3 using 18B coin flips.
This claim implies the theorem because it is known that distinguishing these coins requires Ω (1/ 2 ) coin flips; in other words, it implies that ≥ Ω 1/ √ B , so the algorithm's expected regret must be Ω T / √ B . We prove Claim 1 by proving the following two claims: Claim 2: If an algorithm's expected regret is at most T /6, then under the -heads-biased coin, with probability at least 5/6, it outputs the heads hypothesis more times than the tails hypothesis. (And symmetrically under the tails-biased coin.) Claim 3: An algorithm in this coin setting with budget B can, with probability at least 5/6, be simulated for T rounds using at most 18B coin flips -in the sense that its behavior is identical to its behavior on a full sequence of T coin flips.
Proof of Claim 1 from 2 and 3. We will take an algorithm with budget B and regret T and use it to distinguish the coin using 18B coin flips: Using Claim 3, we can simulate the algorithm's behavior for all T rounds using at most 18B coin flips, except with probability 1/6. Then, if the algorithm used the hypothesis heads more times than tails, we guess that the coin is heads-biased, and symmetrically. By Claim 2, our guess is correct except with probability 1/6. By a union bound, therefore, this procedure correctly distinguishes the coin except with probability 1/3, proving Claim 1.
Proof of Claim 2. Suppose the coin being flipped is the heads-biased coin; everything that follows will hold symmetrically for the tails-biased coin. Now, suppose that the algorithm outputs the hypothesis tails for M of the T rounds. Since each round is an independent coin toss, if the hypothesis is tails then its expected loss on that round is
The other regret bounds all follow by (1) upper-bounding γ max ≤ √ c max ; (2) letting K = T B √ c max ; (3) upper-bounding γ; and (4) setting η appropriately. Note that this can only increase K, so the expected budget constraint is still satisfied. The modifications simply give a different bound in Expression 9, from which the rest of the argument follows analogously.
From (1) and (2), Expression 9 becomes
First, if we know γ, then picking η = Θ(1/M ) gives the corresponding bound. Second, with only knowledge ofc = 
